In a dynamic model with both private and local public capital accumulation, this paper examines how federal and local income taxes, local consumption tax, and federal matching grants for local public consumption and local public investment Ž . affect the long-run equilibrium equilibria of private consumption, private capital accumulation, local public consumption, and local public capital stock. ᮊ
I. INTRODUCTION
In a static and utility-maximizing framework, many existing studies have analyzed the effects of intergovernmental grants on local public spending Ž .
2 by examining the implied price substitution and income effects. While w x Zou 13 has examined some dynamic effects of federal grants on local public consumption and investment, tax revenues of the federal government and local governments are assumed to be constant and the effects of taxes, grants, and local public spending on private sector's consumption, production, and investment are totally ignored. To remedy these deficiencies, this paper first presents a model of local economic growth to include both public and private capital accumulation, spillovers between public and private sectors, and dynamic budget balance of federal and local governments. Then, by dividing local public expenditures into public consumption and public investment, it examines how federal income tax, local Ž taxes, and intergovernmental grants matching grants for local public 1 The main ideas in this paper were suggested by two referees of this journal on my Ž Ž . . previous paper H. Zou , Journal of Urban Economics, 36, 98᎐115 1994 . Here I acknowledge their contributions to this paper. I also thank Richard Bird, Jan Brueckner, Hamid Davoodi, Shantayanan Devarajan, Gunnar Eskeland, Anwar Shah, Danyang Xie, and referees for their comments and help. All remaining errors are mine. The opinions expressed here are not necessarily those of the World Bank. . consumption and investment affect local public investment, private capital formation, local public consumption, and private consumption.
This approach provides us with a convenient framework to study new areas of local and urban finance. First, the integration of both grants and taxes in a dynamic framework offers a different perspective to understand the interactions among taxes and grants and their general-equilibrium effects. In this integrated framework, for example, it can be seen more clearly how incentives for public investment may also become the incentives for private investment, and how budget constraints of the federal and local governments are consolidated to neutralize the effects of some federal grants. Second, while the role of public consumption and public investment in improving private welfare and private capital accumulation Ž w x w x has been previously considered Arrow and Kurz 1 , Barro 2 , and w x. Devarajan et al. 4 , growth implications of local taxes and federal grants have not been explored in local and urban finance literature. This paper, built on those contributions, explicitly models the externalities of local public capital accumulation on private investment and analyzes how local economic growth responds to various taxes and grants. Thus the model here is broad and realistic enough to allow us to confront the data and make empirical assessments on the growth effects of taxes and grants.
I organize this paper as follows. In Section II, I set up a basic model in which a representative agent's utility function depends on private consumption and local public consumption, and private sector's production is defined on private capital stock and local capital stock. The role of the federal government is to collect an income tax from the private sector and to allocate the proceeds to localities through matching grants for local public consumption and local public investment. A representative local government collects local taxes and receives grants from the federal government and optimally chooses its spending on public consumption and investment; the private sector takes federal government's and local govern-Ž . ment's actions taxes, grants, and public spending as given and optimally decides how much to consume and invest. In Section III, I examine the stability and equilibrium of the resulting dynamic system and analyze the effects of various taxes and grants on the equilibrium values of private consumption, local public consumption, private investment, and local public investment. In Section IV I extend the basic model to a modified Arrow᎐Kurz utility function by defining the representative agent's utility function on both local public consumption and local public capital stock in addition to private consumption. Some significant differences between the basic model and the modified Arrow᎐Kurz model will be presented. I conclude this study in Section V by summarizing the main findings and pointing out some direction for future research.
II. THE BASIC MODEL
A representative agent in a typical locality has an increasing, concave, and continuously differentiable utility function defined on private consumption, c, and local public consumption E:
The separability in the utility function greatly simplifies the analysis, but it is not essential for the results obtained in this paper. The production function of the representative agent has two inputs: private capital stock k and local public capital stock k . Let y denote the p s output, and
The production function has the properties y ) 0, y ) 0, y -0, y -
0, y s y ) 0, and y y y y 2 ) 0; that is to say, the production 12 21 11 22 12 function is increasing, concave, and continuously differentiable, and, in particular, local public capital stock is complementary to private capital stock in the production. The production function also satisfies the usual Inada conditions: y ª ϱ as k approaches zero, and y ª 0 as k ap-
proaches infinity, for i s p and s. At each time period, the federal government collects an income tax from the private sector at the rate ; its expenditures consist of two matching f grants for local governments: a matching grant for local public investment Ž . at the rate ␣ 0 -␣ -1 and a matching grant for local public consump-Ž . tion at the rate ␤ 0 -␤ -1 . If the federal government's budget is always assumed to be balanced, then
where k is the public investment undertaken by a typical local governs ment. The representative local government collects an income tax at the rate s Ž . on the private sector the case of the United States and a consumption tax Ž on private consumption a resemblance to the sales tax collected by c . 3 local governments in the United States . These tax rates are often set by the federal governments in many countries and cannot be chosen by local governments, or in the United States, they are chosen by local govern- 3 All tax rates in this paper are exogenous parameters. The optimal choices of tax rates and w x grants will not be considered in this paper; see Zou 14 for a study on the optimal design of federal grants to localities. ments and cannot be often changed by local governments. The total revenue of a typical local government consists of a local income tax, a consumption tax, and two matching grants from the federal government; its expenditures are public consumption, E, and public investment, k . s Therefore its budget constraint is˙
Ž .
The representative agent's budget constraint is given by the condition that the after-tax income is equal to the total spending on private con-Ž . sumption, 1 q c, and private investment, k :
Ž . The current-value Hamiltonian function for the representative agent is
where is the costate variable. 
plus the transversality condition lim uЈ c 1 q k e y t s 0.
Ž .Ž . c p tªϱ
Similarly, the optimal conditions for the representative local government can be derived. The local government is assumed to maximize the repre-sentative agent's welfare by choosing E and k while taking the time paths s of c, k , grants, and taxes as given, or
The current-value Hamiltonian function for the local government is
where is the costate variable.
s Ž . The optimal conditions for the local government's optimization are 5
and the transversality condition is
In this model, the federal government has been assigned the simple roles of a tax collector and a grantor, because nation-wide public consumption and public investment are excluded from the model. To include these federal expenditures into the model is straightforward, but it is analytically difficult to deal with six differential equations at the same time.
To complete the model setup, it is necessary to integrate the federal Ž . government's budget constraint 3 into the necessary conditions for opti-Ž . Ž . mization. That can be done easily. Substituting Eq. 3 for ␣ k in Eq. 4 s leads to an integrated budget constraint for the federal and local governmentsk
hich says that all tax revenues are allocated to local public investment k s and local public consumption E.
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Equations 8 , 10 , 6 , and 11 compose a complete dynamic system in the four endogenous variables of the model: private consumption, public consumption, private capital, and public capital. This dynamic system is the focus of the analysis in the next section. 
, local public capital stock, and private consumption in the long run. Its effect on local public consumption is ambiguous. These results can be explained as follows: while a higher federal income tax reduces the after-tax returns on private investment and leads to a lower private capital accumulation, it also reduces local public investment because a smaller Ž private capital stock lowers the productivity of public capital note that Ž . .
Ž .
On the right-hand side of Eq. 17 , the second and the third terms are reduced as a result of a higher federal income tax, but the first term may Ž be higher or lower the familiar property of the Laffer curve for income . tax or inflation tax .
Second, a rise in the federal matching grant for local public investment leads to more local public capital stock, more private capital stock, and more private and public consumption in the long run. The reason for these results is simple. The federal matching grant for local public investment creates more incentive for the local government to undertake more investment and accumulate more public capital stock, which in turn improves the productivity of private investment. Thus, in the long run, both local public capital and private capital are increased as a result of a higher federal matching grant for local public investment. As both private and local public capital stocks increase after the rise in the federal matching grant for local public investment, more output is produced and more private consumption obtained. Local public consumption also increases because more income tax and more consumption tax are collected with the rise in private production and private consumption. Now I turn to a few results which are not so obvious from the model. which do not have definite signs because the numerators can be positive or negative while the common denominator is always positive. As for both private and public consumption, their ambiguities follow the ambiguities of the capital stock and output.
The economic intuition for this result is the following: the direct impact of a rise in the local income tax is a reduction in private investment and an increase in local public investment. But the rising public investment also stimulates private investment due to the fact that these two capital inputs are complementary in production. Thus, the net effect of a rise in the local income tax on output production is not clear. Proposition 3 leads to a similar issue regarding the optimal local income tax for financing local w x public investment as found in different contexts by Barro 2 and w x Devarajan et al. 4 . Essentially, due to the externality of local public capital on private production, a small income tax as a way of financing local public investment is always justified. But when the income tax rate is rising above a certain point, the corresponding disincentive for private production will outweigh the benefits of public capital formation. Naturally, the optimal choice of a local income tax schedule can be determined by the cost᎐benefit analysis in a dynamic growth model similar to that in this paper. PROPOSITION 4. In the long run, the federal matching grant for local public consumption has no effect on pri¨ate capital stock, local public capital accumulation, pri¨ate consumption, and local public consumption.
To show this result, I first point out that both private and public capital stocks are independent of the federal matching grant for local public Ž . Ž . consumption in the long run as in the steady-state equations 12 and 13 . Once the long-run public capital stock is determined, the spending on the long-run local public consumption is decided as a residual.
This result is quite counter-intuitive. In general, we expect that a rise in the federal matching grant for local public consumption would lead to locality to divert more local resources from public investment to consumption. This conclusion is a fact which can be derived from many static models on local government spending. But what we usually expect does not hold in the long-run analysis based on a sound dynamic structure. In particular, I want to draw attention to the surprising conclusion that this matching grant does not even change local public consumption in the long run. To put it in a policy context, we may question the effectiveness of many federal incentive programs for local welfare and public consumption. In the long run, a matching grant for investment turns out to be more effective in providing more local public consumption than a matching grant for consumption. PROPOSITION 5. An increase in the local consumption tax has no effect on the long-run capital stocks, but it reduces pri¨ate consumption and raises local public consumption.
That local consumption tax has no effect on the long-run accumulation of both private and local public capital can be seen directly from the Ž . Ž . steady-state equations 12 and 13 , because the local consumption tax does not appear in these two equations, which determine the long-run Ž . Ž capital stocks. Then, from Eq. 14 , as the after-tax income, 1 y y f . Ž . y k , k , is fixed, consumption has to be reduced corresponding to a s p s rise in the consumption tax. With a higher consumption tax, local public Ž . consumption will increase and its magnitude can be derived from Eq. 15 : dErd s c ) 0. Therefore, a local consumption tax only reallocates a c given amount of resources between the private sector and public sector and cannot stimulate either private or public capital accumulation in the long run.
IV. THE MODIFIED ARROW᎐KURZ UTILITY FUNCTION
It should be emphasized that many results derived in Sections II and III Ž . above depend on the commonly accepted utility function defined in 1 . But if the utility function is defined on both local public consumption and Ž local public capital in addition to private consumption a suggestion from w x. Arrow and Kurz 1 ,l then, in the long run, the federal matching grant for local public consumption and a local consumption tax do affect the long-run accumulation of both private and public capital. To make this point clear, let me first extend the model setup to include the Arrow᎐Kurz utility function Ž
Ž . Now, the dynamic system differs from that previous only in Eq. 21 . It w x can be shown as in Arrow and Kurz 1 that, unlike the model in Sections II and III, there may exist multiple equilibria here, so that the nice properties of the unique equilibrium of the previous model disappear with Ž . the introduction of w k into the utility function. That is to say, Proposis tions 1 and 2 do not hold any more in the new model. With multiple equilibria, it is necessary to choose a saddle-point equilibrium to linearize the dynamic system above, which amounts to assuming that, at some Ž . equilibrium state, c, E, k , k , out of the possible few, the 4 = 4 matrix, p s denoted as MЈ, has a positive determinant ⌬Ј. This is to guarantee that there exists a unique perfect foresight path in the neighborhood of this equilibrium. With this assumption, the comparative equilibrium analysis can proceed as usual.
In this selected saddle-point equilibrium, the equilibrium conditions of Ž . Ž . Ž . the new dynamic system are 12 , 14 , 15 , and
The difference between these equilibrium conditions and those previous is Ž . Ž . that Eq. 13 has been changed to Eq. 22 here, which implies that the reduces both private and public capital stocks with the Arrow᎐Kurz utility function. Furthermore, in the long run, a federal matching grant for local public consumption has either no effect or negative effect on the equilibrium level of local public consumption. Ž . for the equilibrium condition in 22 to be maintained. The rise in private capital stock follows:
dk rd s yy y dk rd ) 0.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 6 stands in sharp contrast to Proposition 5 in the previous section. Without the Arrow᎐Kurz utility function, Proposition 5 has shown that long-run capital stocks are independent of consumption tax. With the Arrow᎐Kurz utility function, the rising local government's revenue as a result of a higher consumption tax will be allocated to both local public consumption and local investment in both the short run and the long run.
Ž . Unlike equilibrium condition 13 where long-run local public capital does not depend on the utility from local public consumption, the new equilib-Ž . rium condition of 22 underlies the balance between local public investment and local public consumption. In particular, if a higher consumption tax only gives rise to a rise in local public consumption, the marginal utility from the unchanged local public capital stock will be higher as seen clearly Ž . from Eq. 22 . To maintain this equilibrium condition, more local revenue will be invested in local public capital accumulation. As local public capital stock increases, the marginal productivity of private investment also rises. Therefore, all capital stocks and output in the long run will be higher as a result of a higher consumption tax.
V. SUMMARY
In a modified optimal growth model with both private and local public capital accumulation, this paper has made a preliminary attempt to examine how federal and local income taxes, local consumption tax, and federal matching grants for local public consumption and local public investment Ž . affect the long-run equilibrium equilibria of private consumption, private capital accumulation, local public consumption, and local public capital stock. The main findings are summarized in Table 1 according to the two Theoretically, both types of preferences are reasonable even though it is more often the case that the utility function is defined in private and public consumption. Since the implications of various policies are so different as a result of these two specifications of preferences, the issues can only be settled empirically in future studies. the four eigenvalues of this dynamic system. It is well known that the
